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CONSEQUENTIALISM, CLIMATE HARM AND INDIVIDUAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
Christopher Morgan-Knapp and Charles Goodman 
Binghamton University 
 
 
Steven Gardiner recently proposed a do-or-die test for moral theories. If a moral 
theory does not acknowledge that failure to address a pressing, anthropogenic, 
and tractable global threat is a serious criticism of it, he says, then that theory is 
“inadequate and must be rejected.” (Gardiner 2011, 218)  
We might wonder what moral theory could possibly fail such a test. It is, after all, 
an awfully low hurdle. To pass the test, a theory doesn’t need to successfully 
address the global threat: it merely needs to acknowledge that failing to 
successfully address it is a problem. And how could a serious moral theory 
simultaneously recognize that something is a significant moral problem, and then 
imply that doing nothing about it is just fine? 
According to some ethicists, though, this is just what act-consequentialism could 
do in response to anthropogenic climate change. In particular, they think that 
even if widespread, voluntary reductions in carbon emissions are both necessary 
and sufficient to avoid a climate catastrophe, act-consequentialism will counsel 
against making them. 1  Their first point is that, in consequentialist terms, 
anthropogenic climate change should be avoided: the world we are in for if 
nothing is done to avert (or at this late date, diminish) climate change is much 
worse than worlds we could bring about by choosing to emit less carbon into the 
atmosphere. Their second point is that act-consequentialism implies that the vast 
majority of us should not reduce our emissions. And this will be so, they say, even 
if such reductions are needed to avoid the awful consequences of climate change. 
Here is how one such critic, Ronald Sandler, makes the case for this second point: 
Almost any action performed by almost any agent will have a vanishingly 
small effect on [climate change]. Many of these same actions will have 
burdens for the agent and those close to her (i.e., family and friends), in 
terms of, for example, time, economic costs, social costs, and professional 
                                                      
1 Gardiner himself says that “standard utilitarian thinking (such as cost-benefit 
analysis) might well fail the … test.” (241) But his worries primarily concern the 
use of act-consequentialism as a decision procedure and hence are different from 
the more theoretical worries we will be discussing.  
 2 
costs. In such cases the local utility of actions that contribute to [climate 
change] … will outweigh the inconsequential global utility of those actions. 
Therefore, act utilitarianism cannot explain why we ought to act or live in 
ways [needed to mitigate climate change] when doing so has costs or 
sacrifices associated with it. (Sandler 2010, 170-1) 
Sandler takes his argument to be reason for rejecting consequentialism, but other 
theorists are willing to bite the bullet: they take the same reasoning to show that 
we aren’t really morally obligated to emit less. After characterizing the problem of 
climate change as a tragedy of the commons (which he abbreviates ‘T of C’), 
Baylor Johnson asks whether taking unilateral, individual steps to lower emissions 
is morally required. His answer: 
The only reason to adopt unilateral restraint is to avert a T of C. So if 
unilateral restraint cannot reasonably be expected to achieve its purpose, 
there is no reason, and hence no moral reason to adopt it. …. I claim that 
averting a T of C is the only reason for adopting unilateral restraint 
because in a T of C there is nothing wrong with any one person’s use of 
the commons. No one person’s use is large enough to harm the commons. 
Harm results only from the aggregate level of use. (Johnson 2003, 277)  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, too,  argues against an individual moral obligation to 
reduce our emissions grounded in the claim that individual emissions make 
climate change worse. “The problem with this argument,” he says, is 
that my act of driving does not even make climate change worse. Climate 
change would be just as bad if I did not drive. …. Global warming and 
climate change occur on such a massive a scale that my individual driving 
makes no difference to the welfare of anyone. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 
301) 
Similar reasoning can also underlie the idea that consequentialists should use 
something other than actions as their primary evaluative focus. Take, for instance, 
Dale Jamieson’s defense of the idea that when moral problems like climate change 
are at issue consequentialists should focus on character traits rather than actions. 
There he claims that “Joy-riding in my ’57 Chevy will not in itself change the 
climate, nor will refraining from driving stabilize the climate…” and takes this to 
be an instance of a general problem; namely that if we look only at the 
consequences of actions in “large-scale collective action problems … it appears 
that both morality and self-interest demand that ‘I get mine,’ since whatever 
others do, it appears that both I and the world are better off if I fail to 
cooperate.”(Jamieson 2007, 167) 
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Act-consequentialists will be happy to hear that these authors are all mistaken: as 
we show in what follows, embracing act-consequentialism should not lead to 
complacency, much less a sense of righteousness, regarding our individual 
emissions. Quite the contrary, it implies that most of us should be making 
immediate and significant reductions in our contributions to the global stock of 
greenhouse gases. Act-consequentialism does not fail Gardiner’s test. 
But it is not only act-consequentialists who should be heartened. Johnson and 
Sinnott-Armstrong both seem to find their own conclusions regarding the moral 
status of frivolous emissions counter-intuitive, if not morally dubious. It seems they 
embrace them only because that is where their arguments take them. 
Understanding why spending one’s Saturday speeding up and down the river on 
one’s powerboat is wrong because of its contribution to climate change should 
thus help them bring their gut intuitions in line with their commitment to rational 
analysis.  
Deontologists, too, should welcome this result. As we will detail below, at the root 
of these challenges to act-consequentialism is the idea that individual emissions are 
harmless. If that were right, a deontological duty to reduce one’s emissions that 
appeals to a constraint against harming, or against risking harm, could not even 
get off the ground: a constraint against harming can’t prohibit doing something 
harmless. But while deontological approaches may well face other difficulties in 
this context, our analysis will show why this is not one of them. 
And finally, the reasoning at the core of this challenge to act-consequentialism is 
hardly esoteric. We suspect that many outside of academic philosophy think of 
their own lifestyle choices in similar terms.  That is, though they acknowledge that 
their carbon footprint is heavier than it needs to be, many also conclude that this 
does not matter. If they were to give up their powerboat, or their exotic vacations, 
or their air conditioning, they think, this would not change anything regarding the 
climate. All it would really do is diminish their own contentment. Even from a 
moral perspective, then, it seems to them pointless. To the extent that such 
thinking is common, understanding where it goes wrong is an important step 
towards helping people make the choices that are necessary to avert a climate 
catastrophe.   
§1. Preliminaries 
Our core thesis is that act-consequentialism implies that luxury greenhouse gas 
emissions are typically wrong. Before mounting our defense, though, let us begin 
with some clarifications.  
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To say that some type of action is typically wrong is ambiguous. Following Parfit, 
we can distinguish two senses of ‘wrong’ that are germane to the current 
discussion. First, we might say that an action is ‘wrong in the fact-relative sense’ 
just when it would be morally impermissible to choose the action if we knew all 
the relevant facts. By contrast, we might say an action is ‘wrong in the evidence-
relative sense,’ just when it would be morally impermissible to choose the action if 
what the available evidence gives us reason to believe were true.2 
To see the difference, consider one of Parfit’s examples: You know that 100 
miners are trapped underground, with floodwaters rising. You know that they are 
all in one of two shafts, but have no reason to believe they are in one rather than 
the other. You can choose to close one of three flood-gates, and you know that the 
consequences of your choice would be as follows: 
    THE MINERS ARE IN  
  SHAFT A SHAFT B 
 GATE 1 You save 100 You save 0 
YOU CHOOSE GATE 2 You save 0 You save 100 
 GATE 3 You save 90 You save 90 
 
In the fact-relative sense, it would be wrong to close Gate 3. This is because if you 
knew all the relevant information, you would know where the miners were, and 
hence could save more lives by choosing to close either Gate 1 or Gate 2. But in 
the evidence-relative sense of ‘wrong,’ it would be wrong to choose either Gate 1 
or Gate 2. This is because given the available evidence, they could be in either 
Shaft A or B, and so by closing one of them you have only a 50% chance of saving 
100, whereas if you close Gate 3 you are sure to save 90. (Parfit 2011, 159) 
We will have something to say about what act-consequentialism implies about the 
wrongness of emissions in the fact-relative sense. But when we say that act-
consequentialism implies that luxury emissions are typically wrong, we mean this 
in the evidence-relative sense. This is because the evidence-relative sense is the 
sense of wrongness that is relevant when we are trying to decide what to do. When 
                                                      
2 This distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction others have labeled with 
the terms ‘subjective rightness’ and ‘objective rightness.’ As we will explain, it is 
this distinction that lies behind the shift some utilitarians have made from actual 
to expected utility as the target choices are aimed at, morally speaking.  
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making decisions, we often do not – and indeed cannot – know all the relevant 
facts. We are making decisions under uncertainty, and hence are really choosing 
which risks to run rather than which outcome to bring about. This is especially 
clear when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, which may stay in the 
atmosphere for centuries: we cannot have justified beliefs concerning precisely 
what the particular molecules of CO2 we put into the atmosphere now will cause 
200 years from now. So the pressing question prospectively is what we should and 
shouldn’t decide given the evidence that is now available. And since the authors 
with whom we disagree are all interested in understanding what we should now 
decide to do about greenhouse gas emissions, they too are, or at least should be, 
focused on what is wrong in the evidence-relevant sense.  
The second point that needs clarifying is what we mean by ‘act-consequentialism.’ 
Common to all versions of act consequentialism is the idea that the wrongness of 
an action is solely a function of the impersonal value of its outcome. But different 
variations on this core idea can be more and less plausible analyses of different 
senses of ‘wrong.’ One straightforward version of act-consequentialism holds that 
actions are wrong if there is some available alternative action whose outcome 
would be impersonally better. This version is a plausible consequentialist analysis 
of wrongness in the fact-relative sense. But it is not a plausible consequentialist 
analysis of wrongness in the evidence-relative sense. Consider again, the case of 
the miners. This theory would imply that your choosing Gate 3 is wrong, because 
even given only the available evidence, you can be sure that there is an available 
alternative that has a better outcome. As we suggested above, though, choosing 
Gate 3 does not seem wrong in the evidence-relative sense. 
A far better act-consequentialist analysis of evidence-relative wrongness holds that 
an action is wrong just in case there is an available action whose outcome has a 
better expected value. The expected value of an action’s outcome is the sum, over 
all possible outcomes, of the value of each possible outcome multiplied by the 
chances of that outcome occurring.  
A final comment is in order regarding ‘luxury’ emissions. Here we follow many in 
making a distinction between increasing atmospheric carbon concentrations by, 
say, heating one’s private swimming pool and by eating enough vegetables to stay 
healthy. The former is a luxury emission, while the latter is what is often called a 
‘subsistence’ emission. (Shue 1993) There are several ways of generalizing this 
distinction. In what follows, we will use these terms to refer to the position any 
particular emission occupies on a spectrum that ranges from the most beneficial to 
the most frivolous emissions. On one side of the spectrum – the subsistence side – 
are emissions that make a very significant contribution to people’s quality of life, 
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while on the other side – the luxury side – are those whose contribution is 
comparatively trivial.3 
So to sum up, when we say that act-consequentialism implies that most luxury 
emissions are wrong, we are saying that when most of us increase atmospheric 
carbon in ways that do relatively little to improve our lives, there are alternative 
choices we could make whose outcomes have a higher expected value, and 
consequently that causing such emissions is morally wrong in the evidence-relative 
sense. 
§2. The Initial Analysis and Two Challenges 
We start with an assumption that would be granted by all the authors we are 
engaged with: things will not go as well as they could unless emissions are reduced.  
Given this assumption, there is a straightforward reason for thinking that most 
luxury emissions are wrong according to act-consequentialism. Since reducing the 
aggregate level of emissions could improve on the status quo, and choosing to 
forgo luxury emissions would reduce aggregate emissions without causing much 
hardship, it seems things would be better if we choose not to emit luxuriously. And 
if so, some luxury emissions must be wrong according to act-consequentialism. 
(Exactly which luxury emissions will be wrong will be a function of how far above 
the optimal level of emissions we currently are. Here is one way to visualize how 
this would work: imagine ordering all emissions on our spectrum, from the most 
beneficial to the least. Now, starting from the most beneficial emissions, add the 
emissions in order until the optimal level of emissions is reached. Any emissions 
that would lie beyond this point would be wrong, provided the straightforward 
analysis holds.) 
Avram Hiller makes a very similar point. The crucial issue, he recognizes, is how 
much harm a luxury emission like a Sunday drive creates. And, he says, “there is a 
fairly elementary way to determine the answer: 
(Step 1) Estimate the amount of GHG emitted by the one drive, d. 
(Step 2) Estimate the total amount of GHG emissions responsible 
for climate change, e. 
(Step 3) Estimate the total amount of harm that climate change will 
cause, h. 
                                                      
3 Where any given emission falls will depend, of course, on the correct theory of 
well-being. While resolving this will sometimes be important in practice, it won’t 
be necessary for the more theoretical points being made here. 
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(Step 4) Calculate (d/e) x h.” 
Performing that calculation, he suggests, yields the result that a Sunday drive 
produces harm that “is the moral equivalent of ruining someone's afternoon.” 
(Hiller 2011, 357-8) 
This straightforward analysis trades on the thought that the disvalue of global 
emissions can be simply disaggregated: that the disvalue of each individual 
emission is simply its share of the disvalue of total emissions. To this we can add 
that, if we grant simple disaggregation, and we grant that it is better for aggregate 
emissions to go down, then it must be better if those individual emissions that 
produce relatively little good are eliminated. The aggregate value, we might think, 
is just the sum of its parts, and so if the aggregate value is sub-optimal, then the 
least beneficial of its parts must be sub-optimal as well.  
Implicit or explicit scepticism about simple disaggregation, however, is what leads 
many to the conclusion that individual decisions to avoid luxury emissions do not 
make things any better. How could this be? Two lines of thought seem initially 
plausible. The first is that many of our luxury emissions will occur whether we 
choose to avoid them or not. A compelling example is airline travel. On the 
simple disaggregation model, when one flies to Europe for vacation, one is 
responsible for emitting the amount of carbon that the plane emits divided by the 
number of passengers on the plane. But, as several have pointed out, attributing 
this fraction of the plane’s emissions to your choice is suspect.4 If you had chosen 
against taking the European vacation, they say, your flight would have gone 
anyway and the same amount of carbon would have been emitted. So whether or 
not you choose to be on the plane makes no difference to the amount of carbon 
released into the atmosphere.  
This reasoning can be generalized quite broadly. When we buy things, even 
including fuel, it is typically true that if we had not bought them, somebody else 
would. So the emissions that are connected to that product will occur whether we 
are the purchaser or not. It is not as if the particular carbon atoms that are  
released into the air when someone fires up their jet-ski would have stayed in the 
ground otherwise; those atoms were already in the energy pipeline, and if the jet-
skier hadn’t burned that gas, someone else would have. Given this, it can be hard 
to see what good forgoing a spin around the lake will do, at least as far as the 
                                                      
4 For instance, Joaquim Sandberg asks “How much of a [passenger plane’s] 
pollution does an individual passenger cause?” and answers “…it would seem that 
my behavior actually has no marginal effect here. Just as much carbon dioxide 
will be emitted irrespective of whether I [am on the plane].” (Sandberg 2011, 232). 
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climate is concerned – that carbon is going to find its way into the atmosphere no 
matter what. 
The second source of scepticism about simple disaggregation is more 
philosophical. It starts from the idea that what makes luxury emissions bad in the 
aggregate is their affects on welfare. The next step is to claim that welfare is 
affected for the worse only if there is some discernible difference in the subject’s life: 
if their experience is different, or their desires are less satisfied, or so on. But, it 
seems, the climate is such a vast system, and each individual decision to emit 
carbon so small, that individual emissions cannot make any discernible difference.  
While trillions of luxury emissions might change the climate in ways that make a 
noticeable and negative difference to the lives of many Bangladeshis, for instance, 
no Bangladeshi will ever feel any different if you choose to lower your thermostat 
by a degree on a particular day. 
Unless we can dissolve these two challenges, act-consequentialism is in trouble vis-
à-vis Gardiner’s test. If, for either reason, no good comes from most individual 
decisions to forgo luxury emissions, then act-consequentialism will not give us 
grounds to object to them. But in the aggregate, such emissions are very bad. So 
act-consequentialism would tell us not to do what is necessary in order to avoid 
what is a morally terrible outcome, even in consequentialism’s own terms. The 
task for us then, is to show what is wrong with both of these challenges.  
§3. Market Thresholds 
In a discussion of the relationship between utilitarianism and vegetarianism, Peter 
Singer showed how act-consequentialists have the theoretical resources to justify 
moral criticism of behaviors such as airline travel.5 The problem for Singer was 
why utilitarians should not buy meat, given that a single decision not to buy meat 
seemed to make no difference to the number of animals raised and killed for food, 
but his solution is directly applicable here. We can start by imagining that you 
would like to go to Europe on vacation, and that the flight you would take 
typically carries 100 people.  True, if you choose to take the flight, it is unlikely 
that this will make any difference to how much jet fuel is burned.  But if 100 
additional people want to fly to Europe on the same airline, the airline will add an 
additional flight to meet the demand.  Of those 100 people, there must be one 
whose decision made the difference, crossing the airline’s threshold for adding 
another flight. 
                                                      
5 Singer 1980, pp. 335-336. The strategy is also invoked in Matheny 2002 and 
Kagan 2011. 
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Might you be that person?  You have, let us suppose, no evidence that would 
license you to conclude that you are any more or any less likely than anyone else 
to be the passenger who causes another flight to be added.  So it would be most 
reasonable for you to assign a subjective probability of 1% to this outcome.  But if 
you are the threshold passenger, then the marginal impact of your decision is that 
one more flight is added.  In this case, your individual choice adds an amount of 
carbon to the atmosphere sufficient to transport 100 people to Europe.  So the 
expected amount of carbon to be emitted as a result of your decision is 1% of the 
carbon normally used to transport 100 people: in other words, exactly the average 
amount of carbon normally emitted per passenger. 
How this analysis of market thresholds figures into an act-consequentialist account 
of the morality of luxury emissions depends on whether we are interested in 
wrongness in the fact-relative or evidence-relative senses. If we were concerned 
with the fact-relative sense, our focus would be on the actual value of the 
outcomes resulting from each person’s choice. For 99 of the people in our 
example, their airline travel produces no emissions. But the trip taken by the one 
person that pushed the airline over the threshold produced, individually, the 
amount of emissions that an entire flight to Europe produces.  Far from being 
innocuous, then, this particular person’s choice made a significant difference to 
the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Provided the other challenges can be 
met, that person’s choice of vacations is thus likely to be wrong in the fact-relative 
sense. 
How our travel decisions will impact airline schedules is a matter of considerable 
uncertainty, however, and in such circumstances, what we are really interested in 
is what is wrong in the evidence-relative sense. Here it is not the actual value of 
our choices, but their expected value that is relevant. In this context, the effect of 
Singer’s reasoning is to bypass completely the effect of skepticism about simple 
disaggregation.  Instead of naively disaggregating by merely assigning an average 
share to each passenger, we compute the probability of being the threshold 
passenger, and then put all the negative consequences caused by crossing the 
threshold onto that outcome.  Mathematically, however, the result will turn out to 
be precisely the same.  Each passenger should deliberate as if he or she was 
causing a proportionate share of the damage; and if the value produced by the 
choice is less than that share, the passenger should not take the flight. 
Since this reasoning can be extended to all cases in which a person’s luxury 
emissions seem to make no difference to the amount of carbon that is released into 
atmosphere, the first challenge to the initial act-consequentialist analysis of luxury 
emissions can be met. 
§4. Meteorological Thresholds 
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Despite its success with the example of the European vacation, though, it may well 
seem that Singer’s threshold analysis can’t help us with luxury emissions like 
recreational weekend driving.  A small probability of causing harm can give us a 
reason not to act.  But if, as many claim, your driving on the weekend has no 
probability at all of causing harm, then an argument based on expected value will 
have no purchase on it.  And it seems intuitively plausible that, given the vast 
scope of the global climate crisis, your individual contribution will make no 
difference.  But is this plausible claim really true? 
The reasoning for the behind the idea that my contribution makes no difference 
can be broken down into two steps. First is the idea that the effect of individual 
emissions on the weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so 
large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an 
individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. The second is 
that vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could 
possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring. 
Perhaps your emission could add one droplet of water from a flood or remove one 
droplet of water from a drought. But if no one can tell the difference such tiny 
impacts make, then there is nothing bad about them occurring. Events are only 
harmful if they make a difference to someone’s experience, and if no one could 
ever tell if a drought or a flood contained one more or less droplet of water, then 
this kind of impact can’t be experienced and so isn’t harmful. 
This kind of reasoning, however, is invalid. Indeed, both steps are incorrect. In 
this section we will discuss the first, and in the subsequent section, the second.  
Can the effects of individual luxury emissions be anything but miniscule? Sinnott-
Armstrong believes not: “No storms or floods, or droughts or heat waves can be 
traced to my individual act of driving,” says he. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 299) 
Unfortunately, this empirical claim is false. Scientists have known for decades now 
that the weather is a chaotic system, in the technical sense of exhibiting sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions.  As scientist Richard Kautz writes, “By 1964 … 
numerical experiments with full-scale weather models confirmed the idea that 
small perturbations grow exponentially in time.” (Kautz 2011, 161) In other words, 
if we start with two descriptions of the state of the atmosphere that differ only in a 
tiny way, and then allow each description to evolve in accordance with the 
equations that we believe explain how the atmosphere changes, they will grow 
more and more different with time.  Indeed, according to Kautz, in our most up-
to-date weather models, the difference between the two descriptions will double 
every few days.  As a result, no matter how well we come to understand the 
atmosphere, scientists believe that it will remain impossible in practice for us to 
predict the weather beyond about two weeks in the future. (Kautz 2011, 161) 
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This means that your decision to take a recreational drive may set off what is 
sometimes called the “butterfly effect.”  The effect is named after Edward Lorenz’ 
famous question: Could a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil lead to a tornado in 
Texas? (Kautz 2011, 13) If we compare the Earth’s future in the scenario in which 
you drive to the future in the scenario in which you don’t, the initial segments of 
these two futures will be almost exactly similar.  But the chaotic mathematics of 
the equations that describe the atmosphere will cause these scenarios to grow 
more and more different from each other with time.  There is some very small but 
non-zero probability that the scenario in which you do not drive features a 
hurricane season next year that contains three hurricanes, whereas the scenario in 
which you do drive features four hurricanes.  An act-consequentialist interested in 
wrongness in the evidence-relative sense must take into account the product of this 
very small probability with the huge amount of damage that an additional 
hurricane would cause.6 
An opponent such as Johnson or Sinnott-Armstrong could object at this stage that 
our argument threatens to lead to paralysis.  Suppose that, having abandoned 
your intention to take a recreational drive, you instead begin to deliberate about 
whether to take a walk in the park or a stroll by the lake.  There is some tiny 
probability that, due to the butterfly effect, your walk in the park will lead to a 
future in which there is one extra hurricane.  Does this probability generate a 
serious moral objection against absolutely anything you might choose to do? 
Well, exactly the same consideration applies to a stroll by the lake: it too might 
generate an extra hurricane.  Equivalently, we could say that your walk in the 
park might prevent one hurricane.  And you have no information to suggest that 
taking a walk in the park is any more likely to cause a hurricane than it is to 
prevent one.  So when you consider the vast probability distribution of all the 
results that might come from your choice throughout the future of the earth’s 
weather, you should be able to see that your subjective model of the distribution is 
rationally required to be symmetrical with respect to this choice.  All the possible 
positive indirect effects and all the possible negative indirect effects of your 
decision to walk in the park instead of the lake will cancel each other out, leaving 
you with no climate-related reason to choose one or the other.  As far as the ethics 
of climate change are concerned, you free to walk in whichever place you would 
enjoy most. 
                                                      
6 Hiller 2011 suggests that the possibility of the planet being pushed across 
‘tipping points’ where feedback loops are started that lead to relatively sudden and 
drastic changes should be handled the same way (361). 
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Similarly, Kautz points out that the answer to Lorenz’ question is yes: the tiny 
effects of a butterfly’s wings could interact with the unstable dynamics of the 
weather to produce a tornado that would not otherwise have occurred at that time.  
And yet, in another sense, butterflies don’t cause tornadoes: 
Because the solar heating isn’t affected, the weather exhibits the same kinds of 
events, from tornados to rainstorms, that we’re accustomed to.  The effect of the 
butterfly is simply to change the schedule of those events. (Kautz 2011, 162)  
We could say the same about the walk in the park as opposed to the stroll by the 
lake. 
Matters are otherwise with the choice to take a recreational drive.  The carbon 
dioxide emitted by the car engine does affect the process by which the sun heats 
the earth, and does change the level of energy in the atmosphere.  Here the 
distribution of effects is not symmetrical.  It is slightly skewed towards worse 
outcomes. 
How should you assess the slight asymmetry in the climate future of the earth in 
the scenario in which you take a recreational drive, as compared to the future in 
the scenario in which you take a walk in the park?  Suppose you reasonably 
believe that you have some scientific understanding of what 3°C of global 
warming would look like.  Suppose that in that scenario, various harmful weather 
events would take place that would not have occurred in a zero-warming scenario: 
more hurricanes, more tornadoes, more floods, more droughts, and so on.  Each 
of these harmful weather events kicks in at a certain level of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  But you have no idea what that level is for any of the events.  In fact, if 
you were to break up all the greenhouse gas emissions between zero warming and 
3°C of global warming into packets equivalent to the amount of greenhouse gases 
your car would emit during a recreational drive, you would have no reason to 
think that the packet from this particular recreational drive is either any more, or 
any less, likely than any other to cause any one of these harmful weather events. 
Given this setup, we can apply Singer’s threshold analysis in a more complicated 
way, and get the same kind of striking conclusion we saw before.  When you 
multiply the harm caused by each of the weather events you are considering by 
the probability that your recreational drive will cause the threshold for that event 
to be crossed, and then sum all the products, you will end up with an amount of 
expected harm that is precisely the overall harm of the increased incidence of 
harmful weather events caused by 3°C of climate change multiplied by one 
recreational drive’s share of the emissions that would cause that much climate 
change. (For expository reasons, this analysis focuses on the number of significant 
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adverse weather events that occur, and not on the precise degree of their intensity, 
a topic to be considered in the next section.) 
Of course, 3°C of climate change would also cause some beneficial effects.  You 
could take credit for your recreational drive’s tiny share of the probability that 
each of these beneficial effects occurs.  But we are assuming for the sake of 
argument that the overall harm caused by 3°C of climate change greatly exceeds 
the benefits.  So you still have a consequentialist moral reason not to drive whose 
strength corresponds to your recreational drive’s proportionate share of the net 
harm caused by 3°C of climate change. 
We have simplified the analysis by looking at a binary choice between no 
warming and the specific 3°C scenario.  To be fully rigorous, we would want to 
take into consideration the probability distribution of the various amounts of 
warming that could occur as a result of human activity.  The resulting calculation 
would be of ferocious complexity.  To actually derive numbers would require all 
kinds of information that we clearly can’t collect.  But suppose we are allowed to 
assume that large amounts of global warming would have many bad consequences, 
and more intense global warming would be even more damaging than less intense 
warming.  We know that the actual calculation, which we can’t do, would assign 
to the contemplated act of recreational driving its tiny proportionate share of a 
wide range of outcomes, ranging from bad to cataclysmic, with only a few positive 
outcomes to offset them.  So even if we can’t know what the overall result would 
be, we can have high confidence that the result of the expected harm calculation 
would be bad enough to give you a moral reason not to take the weekend 
recreational drive. 
Let’s sharpen up that last claim.  You would enjoy your weekend drive, let’s 
suppose, a bit more than your walk in the park.  But part of what we are assuming 
is that if everyone were to engage unconstrainedly in activities that emit 
greenhouse gases, the results would be so bad for future generations that the 
history of the human race would go much worse than in a low-emissions scenario, 
even taking into consideration the benefits that present people would derive from 
enjoying their unconstrained polluting activities.  You have no reason to believe 
that you are special in this regard.  So when we use threshold analysis to assign to 
your weekend drive its proportionate share of the damage from climate change, 
we are licensed to regard that proportionate share as morally outweighing the 
enjoyment of driving that is your share of the benefits from polluting.  Therefore, 
if you are an act-consequentialist, you should conclude that it is morally wrong for 
you to take the weekend drive. 
§5. Perceptibility Thresholds 
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So far we have argued that there is a small chance that individual emissions can 
have significant effects on the weather. It might be that this, when combined with 
Singer’s analysis of the moral relevance of thresholds, is enough to undermine the 
argument that act-consequentialism can’t oppose weekend driving. But we can’t 
be sure. This is because not all the bad consequences of climate change can be 
attributed to increases in the number of extreme weather events. Some of the bad 
consequences are much more graduated and hence the changes over time are 
much more subtle: temperatures and sea levels gradually rise; water tables and 
crop yields gradually fall; and so on. Moreover, some bad consequences will be 
due to weather events being more intense than they would otherwise be. In order 
to be confident in our inference from the badness of aggregate emissions to the 
badness of individual luxury emissions, we must be sure that all the bad effects of 
climate change can be disaggregated.  
As noted above, there are some who think that this is not possible when it comes 
to very gradual changes or changes in the intensity of harmful weather events. 
The reason they are skeptical is that they believe that the difference any individual 
emission makes with respect to such changes is so infinitesimal that no one’s life 
will be any different whether the change associated with a single emission occurs 
or not.7 And if no one’s life is made better or worse by an infinitesimally small 
change, then a consequentialist cannot morally object to an emission that causes it. 
Frank Arntzenius and David McCarthy, however, have shown in another context 
that this line of reasoning, too, is invalid.8 Their paper deals with a fictional 
example involving the administration of electrical shocks of varying intensity, but 
we can translate their argument into the terms of the present debate. Start by 
focusing on a single Bangladeshi who would suffer terribly from the accumulation 
of many subtle effects of climate change caused by future emissions. There is a 
very finely graded spectrum of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
                                                      
7 This might be what Jamieson has in mind when he draws analogy between 
individual emissions and the following case: “I, along with many other people, toss 
an invisible smidgen of something into a blender. A man takes a drink of the 
resulting mixture. Am I responsible for the graininess of the texture, the chalkiness 
of the taste, the way it makes him feel after drinking it, his resulting desire for a 
Budweiser? You might think that I am a smidgen responsible, since a smidgen is 
the amount that I tossed into the blender. But I am tempted to say that I am not 
responsible even for a smidgen of the result because there are so many thresholds, 
non-linearities, and scalar differences that intervene between my action and the 
outcomes.” Jamieson 2014, p. 164. 
8 Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997, pp. 132-135. Norcross 1997, §IV and Kagan 
2011 develop essentially the same point. 
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that starts from the concentrations there would be if emissions stopped right now 
and ends with the concentrations sufficient to cause our Bangladeshi terrible 
suffering. (For the present purposes, we’ll have the concentrations at adjacent 
points on the spectrum differ by the amount of greenhouse gases emitted on a 
recreational drive, but nothing hinges on this: we could have them even more 
finely differentiated.) Now imagine that we could run the following experiment: 
we allow the Bangladeshi to experience how things would be under the climate 
conditions produced by each of those many, many possible atmospheric 
concentrations while holding everything else constant. We give her a very long 
series of experiences, where each one is of how she would feel under a randomly 
chosen greenhouse gas concentration on our spectrum.  And for each of these 
experiences, we ask her to report as accurately as she can how things are for her. 
We then tabulate the results: we list the greenhouse gas concentrations in order, 
and for each concentration, we group together all the reports she gave when she 
experienced the conditions produced by this level of atmospheric carbon.  
What would this table look like? There are two possibilities to consider: either the 
Bangladeshi’s reports are always the same whenever the greenhouse gas 
concentrations are the same, or they are not. But we can be sure that at at least 
one point on our table (and probably many), the reports for adjacent 
concentrations are different. This is because they are different at the end points: if 
the Bangladeshi would suffer terribly from the accumulation of many subtle effects 
of climate change caused by future emissions, then she must feel much worse 
under the concentrations at the end point than at the beginning point. That 
difference must show up somewhere along the spectrum. Consequently, at at least 
some point (and probably many points), the Bangladeshi really can feel the 
difference that the emissions produced by a recreational drive makes. The claim 
that no one will feel such differences would be false. 
Of course, it is unlikely that our Bangladeshi’s powers of introspection are so fine-
tuned and well-calibrated that the reports she gives at any given concentration are 
always the same. Instead we should expect her to sometimes over- or under-report 
what she feels – either because she is paying imperfect attention or because she 
makes mistakes in how what she feels now compares to other feelings in the past. 
But the frequencies of the reports between adjacent concentrations will at least 
sometimes have to be different because they will have to be different at the end 
points. Suppose, for instance, that the Bangladeshi chooses to give her reports 
using a numerical scale where 0 is the number she usually assigns to the starting 
concentration and 10 is the number she usually assigns to the terrible suffering she 
experiences at the highest concentration. As our table progresses up the spectrum, 
the mean of the reports will have to change from near 0 to near 10. And so for at 
least some adjacent concentrations on the spectrum (and probably many, if not 
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all), the mean – or the frequency with which she uses particular numbers to report 
her experience – will have to be different.  
Now to say that the emissions produced by a recreational drive can affect the 
frequency with which a person perceives her suffering to be greater is not to say 
that she will always feel the difference that any particular recreational drive makes. 
But it is to say that at least some recreational-drive-sized emissions will change the 
expected value of her felt quality of life for the worse. This difference should make 
a difference to her, and it does make a difference to our moral assessment of the 
consequences of the recreational drives. It should make a difference to her 
because it gives her a self-interested reason to prefer that those recreational drives 
that reduce the expected value of her felt quality of life not occur. This is because 
she should conclude that the level of suffering she experiences from adjacent 
concentrations whose mean report is different is in fact different: the facts about 
the frequency of her reports give her reason to believe that things actually feel 
worse at the higher of the two concentrations. It is just that the difference she feels 
is so slight that she sometimes misses it or makes mistakes in comparing it to how 
she remembers she felt at other concentrations.  
The moral assessment of the consequences of recreational drives needs to take 
into account the changes in the expected value of people’s lives they can make. 
Consider first those recreational drives that make a change in the expected value 
of the Bangladeshi’s life. When we are asking about wrongness in the evidence-
relative sense, what we are interested in is the expected value of the outcomes of 
our action. Since the value of the Bangladeshi’s felt experience is morally relevant, 
changes in the expected value of her experience are relevant to the permissibility 
of these drives. What should we say about those recreational drives, if any, that 
don’t cause a change in the expected value of her experience? In a fact-relative 
sense, their relationship to her is not a moral consideration, as they do not affect 
her. But in an evidence-relative sense, things are different. Since we will never be 
in a position to know whether our recreational drive is or is not one of those that 
makes a difference, the question at issue is what their expected value is. And since 
the alternatives are that our recreational drive either makes no difference or 
makes the expected value of her quality of life worse, they too have a negative 
expected value vis-à-vis the Bangladeshi.    
We should acknowledge that the impact our recreational drive can have on the 
Bangladeshi, though morally significant, is still tiny. It is likely to be dwarfed by 
the positive impact that a recreational drive has on the driver. Recall, however, 
that we have been considering only one person who can be impacted by a 
recreational drive. In reality, there are (or will be) billions, and the analysis above 
applies to each one of them.  Our luxury emissions lower the expected value of the 
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experiences of people around the globe, and will continue to do so for centuries. 
All those tiny effects thus add up to a significant moral cost in consequentialist 
terms.  
Here, though, a new worry might arise. Can all those billions of tiny negative 
impacts really outweigh the comparatively substantial negative impact of not 
going on a recreational drive? Do tiny impacts on many different people really 
combine to exceed the moral significance of a far more noticeable impact on one 
person? There are several things to say in response. The first is that, strictly 
speaking, our position does not depend on the claim that luxury emissions’ 
contribution to gradual climate change outweighs the benefits for the emitter. As 
we argued, luxury emissions can also cause large-scale weather events. Our claim 
is that together the expected disvalue of these large-scale and small-scale impacts 
is greater than the expected value of at least some luxury emissions to the emitters.  
It is also important to note that this is not the same worry that motivated several 
of the contrary analyses we began with. These authors claimed that act-
consequentialism provides no ground to object to luxury emissions because they 
produced no morally relevant harms, not that the harms they produced were very 
many but very small. The current worry, then, is really a worry about whether 
act-consequentialism gives the correct explanation of the wrongness of luxury 
emissions, not about whether, on its own terms, it can provide any explanation at 
all.  
Finally, the thought that there is some kind of mistake in thinking that all morally 
relevant value is commensurable is hardly new, nor unique to climate change. It 
has been the subject of a great deal of analysis – both positive and negative. This is 
hardly the place to engage in detail with this complicated question. But we should 
note that the particular comparison at issue here is importantly different from the 
kind of comparisons that are normally thought to raise problems. Normally, 
philosophers have been concerned about whether small benefits to many people 
could possibly outweigh a fundamentally important benefit to a single person: for 
instance, some are skeptical that preventing literally any number people from 
suffering from a minor headache could be more valuable than preventing a single 
person from being tortured to death.9 Denying oneself the pleasures of luxury 
emissions is a far cry from being tortured, however. It is not just that these harms 
are of vastly different magnitudes. They differ in kind as well as in degree. Torture 
and death strike at the very core of an agent; they undermine all that could 
plausibly make someone an object of moral concern. Having to wear socks in 
one’s house to be comfortable in the winter does not. To the extent that 
                                                      
9 Norcross 1997 includes an especially rich discussion. 
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skepticism about commensurability is compelling, it is so when things of 
fundamental importance are at stake. Since luxury emissions do not even 
approach this level of importance, and since nearly everyone will grant that 
preventing many small harms can be more worthwhile than preventing a single 
greater harm of the same kind, doubts about the kind of commensurability 
necessary for an act-consequentialist to object to individual luxury emissions 
seems relatively unproblematic. 
So, if the analysis we have presented is correct, all the harms of anthropogenic 
climate change can indeed be disaggregated, and this provides act-
consequentialists with all they need to show that we should eliminate those luxury 
emissions that would be sufficient to bring us down to the level of emissions that is 
impersonally best. Before concluding, however, we should acknowledge that some 
may think that this does not go far enough. For it may be that there are what 
intuitively seem like terribly self-indulgent – and hence morally objectionable –  
emissions whose elimination would not be involved in getting down to the optimal 
level in the least costly way. There could be someone, for instance, whose sense of 
self-worth is tied to using their private jet. Given how central burning fossil fuels is 
to them, it could well be that their emissions contribute enough to their lives so as 
to offset the expected harm they cause, in which case an act-consequentialist may 
have to acknowledge that the emissions themselves are not objectionable. But to 
some, this sounds obnoxious: how could jet-setting emissions possibly be justified 
when we know that they contribute to harms that will befall innocent 
Bangladeshis who are struggling to survive?  
At issue here is the question of whether it can be wrong (in the evidence–relative 
sense) to impose a risk on others even when doing so maximizes expected value. 
Act-consequentialists say no, while others will disagree. This is not a debate it 
makes sense to join here, however, and not only for the usual ‘constraints of space’ 
reason. For the point of our arguments has not been to establish the superiority of 
act-consequentialist analysis of climate ethics vis-à-vis its competitors. Instead, it 
has been to show why one influential source of its supposed inferiority is an 
illusion, and why even those who care only about the effects of their actions from 
an impersonal perspective ought therefore to care about their personal emissions. 
And both these points would still stand even if act-consequentialism doesn’t 
provide an exhaustive account of what makes the difference between those choices 
that are permissible and those that aren’t.  
§6. Conclusion 
The arguments we have developed in this article have often been complex, 
abstract, and counterintuitive.  Yet our main conclusions are neither complex, nor 
abstract, nor counterintuitive.  In pursuing our own perceived self-interest, the 
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rich are doing terrible harm to other people and to the natural systems on which 
humanity’s future depends.  We should act, and act now, to reduce the damage 
we are doing.  When and if we can, we should act collectively, through 
governments, political parties and NGOs.  In the meantime, each of us has an 
individual obligation to do what we can to stop harming others, including by 
refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual 
luxury carbon emissions.  Once people understand the science of climate change, 
they immediately and intuitively recognize that they have reason to comply with 
these straightforward and demanding moral obligations.  Yet many have been led 
away from recognizing what the morality of climate change genuinely requires of 
them by a set of influential, seemingly compelling, but ultimately fallacious 
arguments.  In climate ethics, it seems, a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.    
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